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HANS LINDAHL*
ABSTRACT
This paper scrutinizes the fundamental assumption governing
Gunther Teubner's theory of societal constitutionalism, namely that
societal constitutions are ultimately about the regulation of inclusion
and exclusion in global function systems. While endorsing the central
role of inclusion/exclusion in constitutions, societal or otherwise, I argue
that inclusion and exclusion are primordial categories of collective
action, rather than functional categories. As a result, the self-closure
which gives rise to a legal collective is spatial as much as it is temporal,
and subjective no less than material. Inasmuch as legal orders must
establish who ought to do what, where, and when, this entails, or so I
argue, that any legal order we could imagine-including a global legal
order such as cyberlaw-is necessarily bounded in space, time, content,
and membership. This impinges directly on the inclusion/exclusion
difference: that there can be no inclusion without exclusion entails, most
fundamentally, that there can be no (il)legality without alegality, i.e.
comportment that contests, sometimes radically, how a legal order draws
the distinction between legality and illegality. In this fundamental sense,
all legal orders have an outside-literally. Building on this insight, I
suggest that the functional cosmopolitanism advocated by a theory of
societal constitutionalism retains a residue of the logic of totalization it
seeks to overcome. I conclude by exploring how a first-person plural
theory of law both supports and transforms the insight that constitutions
regulate the inclusion/exclusion difference by putting into place
constitutive and limitative rules.
* Chair of Legal Philosophy at Tilburg University, the Netherlands, and Fellow of
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INTRODUCTION
The theory of societal constitutionalism posits a strong
interconnection between constitutions and the inclusion-exclusion
difference. Drawing on systems theory, Gunther Teubner's thesis that
constitutions are composed of constitutive and limitative rules develops
the insight that constitutions regulate the boundary between a function
system and its environment. In other words, constitutions regulate the
conditions for inclusion in and exclusion from function systems such as
politics, law, economics, religion, and science. The globalization of
function systems renders this twofold role both visible and urgent:
visible because sectors of global society are now organizing themselves
under a societal or civil constitution without recourse to or support by
political constitutionalism; urgent, because the dark side of the
emancipation of function systems from state tutelage is the destructive
expansion of systems into their environments. Accordingly, societal
self-constitution and self-limitation are the two aspects of boundary
regulation, and these two aspects correspond to the inclusive and
exclusive roles of constitutions. Societal constitutions include opening
up and rendering available to all a communicative medium; societal
constitutions exclude laying down the frontier posts beyond which a
function system is not to foray into its environment, individual or
otherwise.
In an effort to assess this interpretation of constitutionalism, I take
my cue from Teubner's claim that it is necessary to think through the
conditions governing the constitutionalization of nonstate legal orders.'
This claim is, in my view, compelling. Although I will not be arguing
this point hereinafter, it would be easy to show that the model of legal
order I will be sketching out strongly supports the claim that there is no
reason for limiting law to state and international law or even for taking
them to be the primordial manifestations of law. I am also happy to
accept his insight that constitutions are ultimately about the regulation
of inclusion and exclusion. His insistence that the renewal of
constitutional theory turns on coming to terms with this difference is a
refreshing alternative to the jaded attempts to deal with globalization
by projecting the conceptual framework of state constitutionalism onto
an all-encompassing global polity. But rather than walking further
down the path of societal constitutionalism, I want to pause at this
juncture and examine the fundamentals of Teubner's account of
constitutions in greater detail. My question is this: Can constitutions be
1. GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS 51-58 (Gareth Norbury trans.,
2012).
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about the regulation of inclusion and exclusion in function systems? In
other words, can we make constitutional sense of inclusion and
exclusion in terms of the boundary between a function system and its
environment? More pointedly, in what sense are constitutions about
societal self-constitution and self-limitation, and how might this cast
new light on the constitutional problem posed by boundaries?
I. SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A FUNCTIONAL READING OF INCLUSION
AND EXCLUSION
In the Storrs Lectures of 2003/2004, Teubner pointed to the
quandaries arising from the globalization of digital communication via
the Internet. Referring to the well-known Yahoo! case in France, he
argued that this and related cases neatly illustrate the continuity and
discontinuity of the "constitutional question" going from the heydays of
state-constitutionalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth century to the
emergence of constitutionalism without a state in our times. Teubner
asked, "[h]ow is constitutional theory to respond to the challenge arising
from the three current major trends--digitalisation, privatisation and
globalisation-for the inclusion/exclusion problem?" 2 There is continuity
insofar as the difference between inclusion and exclusion remains the
central issue to be dealt with by constitutions. There is discontinuity
because digitalization, privatization, and globalization drastically
change how constitutionalism must deal with inclusion and exclusion.
Let us run through how each of these aspects transforms the
constitutional question.
Globalization-the globalization of function systems-changes the
nature of the constitutional question because inclusion and exclusion
cease to be spatially defined categories. In particular, global forms of
law can no longer be conceptualized in terms of the inside-outside
distinction with regards to the territorial state. 3 The point is conceptual,
not merely empirical. As long as function systems are subject to political
regulation, i.e. to regulation by and within a territorial state, it could
seem that inclusion and exclusion are primarily spatial categories. By
contrast, the globalization of function systems clears the way for
understanding inclusion/exclusion as a properly systemic difference. As
Niklas Luhmann puts it, "inclusion (and correspondingly exclusion) can
only be related to the nature and the way in which people are marked in
2. Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centered
Constitutional Theory?, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSrnuTIoNALIsM 3, 4
(Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand & Gunther Teubner eds., 2004).
3. See Gunther Teubner, 'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 14 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
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communication processes, hence are deemed to be relevant."4 In contrast
with the strongly normative stance taken by most social theories, which
take for granted that the exclusion of individuals should be overcome in
view of securing greater inclusiveness, Luhmann argues that the
preferential difference between inclusion and exclusion is a constitutive
feature of communication processes. "One can only meaningfully speak
of inclusion when there is exclusion."5 By implication,, the globalization
of function systems renders inclusion both universal, inasmuch as "the
entire population"6 is in principle included in each system, and partial,
insofar as it only concerns the dimension of personhood relevant to the
system, rather than human beings as such. Consequently, Luhmann
and Teubner's defense of the universality of function systems is inimical
to a logic of totalization-or so they argue-for systems theory views
exclusion as a constitutive feature of function systems, even though the
irritability of systems allows for the recalibration of the boundary
between what is included and excluded.7
I will be more concise as to concerns of privatization, even though
this is arguably the dimension of societal constitutionalism that has
attracted the greatest attention. Teubner is concerned with showing
that the constitutionalization of global sectors of society takes place
outside-and even in opposition to-the domain of institutionalized
state politics.8 It is transnational private actors who, at a considerable
distance from both state and international law, are engaged in
constitution-making in the twofold sense of self-constitution, which is
interpreted as setting up constitutive rules that empower relevant
forms of communication, and self-limitation, interpreted as excluding
the environment from the corresponding communicative medium.9 In a
nutshell, privatization changes the constitutional question because
what is at stake is no longer the self-constitution and self-limitation of a
political community, but rather the self-constitution and self-limitation
of global sectors of society, which have traditionally been viewed as
"private" from the perspective of political constitutionalism.
4. 6 NIKIAS LUHMANN, SOZIOLOGISCHE AuFKIARUNG [SOCIOLOGICAL ENLIGHTENMENT]
229 (4th ed. 2008) (Ger.) (translation by author). For an excellent study on the
inclusionlexclusion difference in Luhmann see Antoon Braeckman, Niklas Luhmann's
Systems Theoretical Redescription of the Inclusion/Exclusion Debate, 32 PHIL. & Soc.
CRITICISM 65 (2006).
5. LUHMANN, supra note 4, at 229.
6. TEUBNER, supra note 1, at 134.
7. NIKLAS LUHMANN, DIE GESELLSCHAFr DER GESELLScHAFr [THE COMMUNITY OF
THE COMMUNITY] 625-26 (1997) (Ger.).
8. TEUBNER, supra note 1, at 51-57.
9. Id. at 75-87.
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With regards to digitalization, Teubner insists time and again that
reformulating the constitutional question in terms of societal
constitutionalism requires a process of generalization and
respecification. Generalization is possible because political
constitutionalism, qua constitutionalism, puts into place constitutive
and limitative rules with respect to a communicative medium (power).
The respecification of constitutionalism as societal constitutionalism is
realized by positing constitutive and limitative rules with respect to the
communicative medium of the system at issue. 10 As concerns
cyberspace, Teubner highlights what is demanded by systemic inclusion
when arguing that digitalization, whatever other questions it may raise,
calls forth the "more fundamental question of a universal political right
of access to digital communication.""1 Obviously, digitalization is but
one example of how societal constitutionalism approaches the problem
of inclusion/exclusion. What is important is, in each case, a
respecification of the boundary between a function system and its
environment: politics/environment; economy/environment;
law/environment; science/environment; and religion/environment.
Fundamental rights play a crucial role in regulating the boundary
between a system and its environment inasmuch as they act both as
constitutive rules by granting access to the respective communicative
medium and as limitative rules by restraining the tendency of the
function systems to encroach on individuals and other function
systems. 12
I wrap up this highly abridged presentation of societal
constitutionalism by pointing to an important qualification with respect
to the relation between constitutionalism and inclusion/exclusion. In
effect, while Luhmann insists time and again that inclusion/exclusion is
a functional difference, he also points to "the impossibility of function
systems to organise themselves."' 3 As a result, the constitutionalization
of inclusion and exclusion is not and cannot be oriented towards
function systems as such. Teubner phrases this qualification as follows:
10. TEUBNER, supra note 1, at 132-135.
11. Teubner, supra note 2, at 4. One may wonder whether the reference to a "political
right" is appropriate here, in view of Teubner's opposition to all attempts to reduce
fundamental rights to political rights.
12. "[I]t is the fragmentation of society that is today central to the question of
fundamental rights as protective rights. There is not just a single boundary concerning
political communication and the individual, guarded by human rights. Instead, the
problems arise in numerous social institutions, each forming their own boundaries with
their human environments." Gunther Teubner, Transnational Fundamental Rights:
Horizontal Effect?, 40 RECHTSFILOSOFIE & RECHTSTHEORIE [LEGAL PHILOSOPHY & LEGAL
THEORY] 191, 208 (2011) (Neth.).
13. LUHMANN, supra note 7, at 843 (translation by author).
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Although these processes [of societal
constitutionalization] are set in motion by functional
differentiation, the constitutionalization process is not
directed toward the major function systems themselves.
Finance and product markets are globalized, scientific
communication takes place at a global level, the systems
of communicative media, news agencies, tv, internet
transmits news across the whole globe. Despite the
operational closure of these world systems . . . [they]
lack the capacity to take action, to become organized
and, therefore to be constitutionalized. The various
attempts at global constitutionalism are directed rather
at social processes "beneath" the function systems, at
formal organizations and at formalized transactions that
are not tied to the territorial borders of nation-states.14
This is a remarkable admission on several counts. First and
foremost, if function systems cannot organize themselves, would one not
have to conclude that constitutionalizing the inclusion and exclusion
difference effectively treats these two terms as categories of action?' 5
More specifically, does not constitutionalization entail that inclusion
and exclusion are categories pertaining to collective action? If they are,
as I will argue later in this paper, this raises a number of questions
about the boundaries that are regulated by societal constitutions: Can
we take it for granted that those boundaries are the boundary between
a function system and its environment? Moreover, if inclusion and
exclusion are categories germane to collective action, what sense are we
to make of the "self' of self-constitution and self-limitation, the two
dimensions of the process of societal constitutionalization? Would we
not have to reintroduce the form of identity that systems theory has
attempted to eradicate definitively from society and from sociology,
namely, collective selfhood? Would not the "autos" of societal autopoiesis
have to mutate, however discretely and even surreptitiously, into the
"self' of collective self-regulation, if one wants to make constitutional
sense of inclusion and exclusion? If so, what happens to the
14. Gunther Teubner, Constitutionalising Polycontexturality, 20 Soc. & LEGAL STUD.
210, 221-22 (2011).
15. Wil Martens raised this objection in his response to Teubner's paper Transnational
Fundamental Rights: Horizontal Effect?, supra note 12. See generally Wil Martens,
Human Rights and the Destructive Communications and Actions of Differentiated Society,
in 40 RECHTSFILOSOFIE & RECHTSTHEORIE [LEGAL PHILOSOPHY & LEGAL THEORY] 246
(2011) (Neth.).
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constitutional question of inclusion and exclusion, both as a question
about inclusion/exclusion and as a question about constitutionalism?
II. "YOU HAVE No SOVEREIGNTY WHERE WE GATHER"'6
To prepare the way for dealing with these issues, it may be helpful
to begin by asking whether the self-constitutionalization of a global
sectorial collective releases inclusion and exclusion from its spatial
dimension, such that what societal constitutions regulate is only the
boundary between a function system and its environment. Let us
consider the example of the digitalization of communication, which was
introduced in the foregoing section. This example seems particularly
apposite because, to the extent that cyberlaw appears to sever the link
between "legally significant (online) phenomena and physical location,"
it would require a novel form of law and legal institutions, one that does
not rely on the physical boundaries of real space.' 7 Indeed,
[wie know that the activities that have traditionally
been the subject of regulation must still be engaged in
by real people who are, after all, at distinct physical
locations. But the interactions of these people now
somehow transcend those physical locations. The Net
enables forms of interaction in which the shipment of
tangible items across geographical boundaries is
irrelevant and in which the location of the participants
does not matter. Efforts to determine "where" the events
in question occur are decidedly misguided, if not
altogether futile.' 8
To be sure, the initial euphoria governing the capacity of the
regulation of the Internet to extricate itself from the clutches of state
law was strongly tempered soon after the publication of the article by
David Post and David Johnson. While the architecture of the net
initially made it very difficult to regulate relevant behavior,
architectures of personal identification and authentication, of content
control, and of geographical tracing and zoning had been put into place
that allowed state law to re-establish its regulatory purchase on
16. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://projects.eff.org/-barlowlDeclaration-Final.html.
17. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (1996).
. 18. Id. at 1378.
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Internet activities.' 9 The well-known lawsuit filed in France against
Yahoo!, in which the plaintiffs demanded that Yahoo! remove Nazi
paraphernalia from its auction site or block access thereto, is a good
example of how legal orders set spatial boundaries on Internet
activities. 20 Although the corporation argued that the Internet is a
global medium and that it could not block French citizens from Yahoo!
sites, the French court not only decided in favor of the plaintiffs, but
eventually also threatened the company with a fine of 100,000 French
francs for each day of delay in complying with its ruling.2 1 Soon after,
Yahoo! installed filters that blocked computers located in France from
access to portions of the auction site. 22 In short, the Net has become
eminently regulable.
Teubner's argument for societal constitutionalism and global law
does not turn, however, on the technological state-of-the-art and, in that
sense, is in no way undermined by these technological developments. To
the contrary, he forcefully argues that cases such as Yahoo! illustrate
the distortions that ensue when the constitutional problem concerning
the conditions of universal access to a communicative medium is leveled
down to a territorially oriented approach to inclusion and exclusion.23 It
is significant, he notes, that the famous Declaration of the Independence
of Cyberspace, drawn up by John Perry Barlow, appeals to the rhetoric
of constitution-making to highlight the process that is gradually giving
shape to a global constitution for digital communication. 24 More
pointedly, Barlow does so in a way that releases the global digital
community from the constraints of territorial inclusion and
exclusion-or so it seems.
So, let us suppose that the emergence of cyberlaw was marked by a
"Declaration" like that penned by Barlow: "Governments of the
Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from
Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of
the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no
sovereignty where we gather."25 In short, imagine the most favorable
19. "The architecture of cyberspace will in principle allow for perfect zoning-a way
perfectly to exclude those who would cross boundaries." Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1409 (1996).
20. UEJF et Licra c/ Yahoo!Inc., Tribunal de Grande Instance [TGI] [ordinary court of
original jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, Juriscom, No. RG 00/05308 (Fr.), available at
http://juriscom.net/wp-content/documents/tgiparis20001120.pdf.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Teubner, supra note 2, at 3-5.
24. Id. at 8-9.
25. A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, supra note 16.
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constellation possible for the (private) self-regulation of the global
digital community.
Let us begin with the final sentence of the passage cited from
Barrow's exuberant Declaration, turning it into a question: Where do we
gather? Where do we gather when, bidding farewell to state sovereignty
and its bounded territory, we enact a constitution for global cyberlaw?
The Declaration has a ready answer: we gather in cyberspace, which "is
a world that is both everywhere and nowhere."26 And it adds shortly
thereafter: "We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may
express his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being
coerced into silence or conformity."27 So, despite the drastic claim that
cyberspace is not the world "where bodies live,"28 what is concretely at
stake in the construction of cyberspace is, amongst others, fostering and
protecting its potential to secure free speech for embodied beings who
are dispersed across the face of the earth, who must type or speak
somewhere if they are to gain access to the global cyber-community, and
who must glance somewhere at a computer screen or listen somewhere
to what someone is typing or saying somewhere. Moreover, the "we" of
the cyber-community is, in Barrow's reading, potentially everyone, not,
however, as an aggregation of individuals but rather as a whole-as a
collective that acts jointly when enacting a constitution such that it is
possible to mock state governments because "you do not know our
culture, our ethics, or the unwritten codes that already provide our
society more order than could be obtained by any of your impositions."29
In short, and returning to the question, "where do we gather?" it would
seem that "where" is everywhere and "we," everyone. So, although
technological developments have allowed states to capture cyberlaw to a
considerable extent, cyberlaw is the exemplar, at least in principle, of a
global legal order, given its capacity to make digital communication
available to everyone everywhere.
But would this global legal order be possible without a spatial
closure, such that inclusion and exclusion cease to be spatial categories
in societal constitutionalism?
Consider the dyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy in
September 2005.3o This controversy casts doubt, to say the least, on the
assumption that the global community of Internet users and service
providers can reach an agreement on access to cartoons and other
26. Id.
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. Id.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Greg Hurst, 70,000 Gather for Violent Pakistan Cartoons Protest, TIMES (Feb. 15,
2006), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/worldlasialarticle2612186.ece (U.K.).
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images of the Prophet Muhammad or, for that matter, of any other
prophet. It also calls attention to the question on behalf of whom, and
where, Barrow speaks when asserting that "we are creating a world
where anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no matter how
singular, without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity."31 Now
that the Yahoo! case has blazed the way, it is tempting to muster
technology to the rescue, implementing filters so that people can be
shielded from having to view images of the Prophet Muhammad,
thereby also allowing those who are less punctilious to view them if they
so wish. The Wikipedia entry on the controversy, for example, helpfully
offered instructions on how to modify the user's default browser settings
to avoid having to look at images of the Prophet Muhammad on the
encyclopedia. 32 But would this solve the problem that the images have
been posted on the Internet, including the web pages of the
aniconism-friendly Wikipedia? In the case of groups and individuals for
whom aniconism is law, the real problem is not to ensure, by the
appropriate technological means, that people can avoid being confronted
with images of the Prophet; it is rather that these images are posted at
all on the net because "[i]nformation available on the World Wide Web
is available simultaneously to anyone with a connection to the global
network."33 The globality of cyberspace becomes the globality of
blasphemy and unbearable affront. The assumption that cyberspace
allows freedom of speech to "anyone, anywhere" because it is indifferent
to place and person amounts to a de-localization, i.e. the denial and
erasure of the bounded spatial configuration of a religious law, and a
novel localization, namely, the configuration of a secularized legal space
that is spatially bounded because images of the Prophet can be shown
anywhere rather than nowhere.
On January 1, 2010, a Somali man "armed with an axe and a knife
in either hand"--or so the Danish police claimed-broke down the
entrance door of Kurt Westergaard's home in Aarhus and attempted to
kill the cartoonist whose drawing lampooning the Prophet in the
Jyllands-Posten had given rise to the controversy.34 The Somali
31. A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, supra note 16.
32. Talk: Muhammad/FAQ, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilTalk:Muhammad/
FAQ (last visited Nov. 19, 2012) ("If you do not wish to view Muhammad images, you can
create an account and read Wikipedia while logged in. User accounts offer a number of
preference settings. . . . [Y]ou can change your personal settings so that you don't have to
see Muhammad images, without affecting other users. This is done by modifying your CSS
(Cascading Style Sheet) page, which is individual to each user. To do this. . .
33. Johnson & Post, supra note 17, at 1375.
34. Somali Charged over Attack on Danish Cartoonist, BBC NEWS (Jan. 2, 2010),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hileurope/8437652.stm.
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allegedly was part of the al-Shabab militia.35 Where did the man come
from when entering Westergaard's home? A BBC news bulletin quotes
Sheikh Ali Muhammad Rage, a spokesperson for the group, as saying,
"We appreciate the incident in which a Muslim Somali boy attacked the
devil who abused our prophet Mohammed and we call upon all Muslims
around the world to target the people like [him]."36 When the Somali
man broke down the door with an axe and stepped in, he entered
Westergaard's home from one of the places "around the world" to which
the spokesperson refers. This is not simply the same world that Barrow
calls "our world." When entering, after having broken down the door,
the Somali man did more than only cross the legal boundary that
separates Westergaard's home from and connects it to the street and,
thence, to the rest of Denmark and the other countries joined together
into a spatial unity under international law. He also entered from a
place outside the interconnected unity of ought-places that make up the
legal world inhabited by Westergaard and Barrow.
Indeed, Westergaard's home is an "ought-place" in that it is a place
in which, according to the Danish legal order, certain comportment
ought to come about, where "ought" means required, prohibited, or
permitted. In turn, this space is both linked to and separated from other
ought-places such as the sidewalk where, again, certain comportment
ought to take place. Boundaries separate these places (e.g. the door
leading into and out of Westergaard's home) and are, as such, legal
boundaries. Importantly, while legal boundaries separate, they also join
ought-places into a more encompassing whole, into a spatial unity, such
that, for example, both Westergaard's home and the sidewalk from
which the Somali man broke into his home are places within the unity
of ought-places that configures the Danish legal order. Also, this legal
order has its own legal boundaries that link it to other unities of
ought-places such as other states or the sea, which are themselves a
higher-order unity of ought-places by dint of their interconnection
through international law.37 This totality of interconnected ought-places
is, strictly speaking, a legal world. When the Somali man entered
Westergaard's home to kill him, he did so from an ought-place that has
no place in the distribution of ought-places made available in the legal
world inhabited by Westergaard and Barrow. The man entered from a
strange ought-place that is, as Barrow puts it, not simply "anywhere."
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Notice that, thanks to international law, the seas are as much legal ought-places as
are state territories. The same holds, of course, for the space of space law.
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He entered from elsewhere: from a strange world-a Fremdwelt, to
borrow Edmund Husserl's terminology.3 8
Where, then, do we gather when enacting a constitution for global
cyberlaw? Somewhere, in a strong sense of the term: in a space that
must have an outside-literally. 39
III. LAW IN THE FIRST-PERSON PLURAL
So, on the face of it, it seems that there can be no global cyberlaw,
no global digital community, absent a spatial closure that separates an
inside from an outside. But what is the nature of this spatial inside and
outside? Why, if at all, might it be constitutive for all global law and, in
fact, for any legal order we could imagine? What might this tell us about
the fundamental sense of inclusion and exclusion that would need to be
addressed by constitutionalism, societal or otherwise?
To address these questions we must shift our attention to the "self'
of societal self-constitutionalization. This shift is required because, as
the reader will remember, Luhmann and Teubner acknowledge that the
self-constitutionalization of global society is not oriented toward
function systems as such, which do not and cannot organize themselves,
but rather toward "organizations." Instead of building on the systems
theoretical notion of an "organization," I will draw on analytical studies
of collective action and on a phenomenology of strangeness to develop a
thumbnail version of what might be called a theory of law in the
first-person plural. 40 To mark this difference, I will refer to legal orders
rather than to systems and to collectives rather than to organizations.
The reason for this shift of conceptual framework is that it allows us to
make spatial sense of what happened on January 1, 2010, when the
Somali man entered Westergaard's home to kill him, and, more
38. See generally 3 EDMUND HUSSERL, ZUR PHANOMENOLOGIE DER
INTERSUBJEKTIVITAT: TEXTE AUS DEM NACHLASS [ON THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF
INTERSUBJECTIVITY: LEGACY TEXTS] (1973) (Ger.).
39. For an analogous analysis of the bounded spatiality of multinationals, see generally
Hans Lindahl, Alegality: Postnationalism and the Question of Legal Boundaries, 73 MOD.
L. REV. 30 (2010). For further analogous analyses, including lex mercatoria and
nomadism, see generally HANS LINDAHL, FAULT LINES OF GLOBALISATION: LEGAL ORDER
AND THE POLITICS OF ALEGALITY (forthcoming 2013).
40. I draw here, in particular, on MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS (2nd ed. 1992)
[hereinafter GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS]; MARGARET GILBERT, A THEORY OF POLITICAL
OBLIGATION: MEMBERSHIP, COMMITMENT, AND THE BONDS OF SOCIETY (2006); and PHILIP
PETTIT, A THEORY OF FREEDOM: FROM THE PSYCHOLOGY TO THE POLITICS OF AGENCY
(2001), as concerns collective action and intentionality. With regard to a phenomenology of
strangeness, I draw, amongst others, on HUSSERL, supra note 38, and 1-4 BERNHARD
WALDENFELS, STUDIEN ZUR PHANOMENOLOGIE DES FREMDEN [STUDIES ON THE
PHENOMENOLOGY OF STRANGENESS] (1997-1999) (Ger.).
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generally, of the spatial closure which is constitutive of all legal orders,
whatever their scale and whatever their kind. The more general
question of whether the analysis I will be developing also holds for other
kinds of social systems and their "operational closure" may remain an
open question for the purpose of this paper.
Let me begin the discussion with some very general considerations
about collectives and collective action. Margaret Gilbert introduces a
distinction between two uses of the expression "we," which helps to
clarify the nature of collectives and their action. Indeed, there is "we,
both," as when each of a manifold of individuals happens to watch a
stork fly over them, and there is "we, together," as when a group of
bird-watchers are out on an expedition and happily call each other's
attention to the bird as it flies by.41 Only in the second case is there a
collective, engaged in collective action. While groups are made up of at
least two individuals, their acts are not merely individual acts, and even
if there are, there can be no collective acts absent the acts of individuals:
we are bird-watching together, not severally. The difference between the
two modes of "we" becomes clear if we bear in mind that if we are
bird-watching together, then each of the participant agents is entitled to
expect that the other agents will alert her to the stork when it flies over
and to rebuke them if they do not.42 The point of their joint action is to
engage in bird-watching. No such entitlements attach to "we, both."
Indeed, the comportment of individuals under "we, both" has no shared
point; "we" functions as an aggregative rather than an integrative
concept.
This is a very crude and preliminary exposition of the notion of
collectives and collective action. While a much more refined analysis is
possible, this exposition suffices for my purposes in this paper.43 Indeed,
my claim is that legal comportment is a species of the genus collective
action. There are obviously other forms of collective action, such as
making music together or simply walking together, both of which are
canonical examples unpacked by theories of collective action. My point
is, simply, that if we want to make sense of legal comportment, then we
41. See GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS, supra note 40, at 168.
42. The reader might remember the memorable text message sent by Rebekah Brooks,
erstwhile editor of Rupert Murdoch's tabloid News of the World, to David Cameron, Prime
Minister of the United Kingdom: "We're definitely in this together!" John Plunkett,
Rebekah Brooks Texted David Cameron: 'We're Definitely in This Together!, THE
GUARDIAN (June 14, 2012, 8:38 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jun/14/rebekah-
brooks-texted-david-cameron.
43. For more detailed analyses of collective action, see generally MICHAEL E. BRATMAN,
FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION AND AGENCY 93-164 (1999);
GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS, supra note 40, at 146-236; Philip Pettit & David Schweikard,
Joint Action and Group Agency, 36 PHIL. Soc. SCl. 18 (2006).
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need to understand it as one particular mode of group action. By the
same token, legal entitlements and sanctions (in response to illegal
comportment) are a species of the structure of entitlements and rebukes
proper to group action in general. Furthermore, and importantly, to the
extent that the acts of participants in joint action interlock with a view
of realizing the point of their joint action, there is always, however
implicitly, a normative dimension in collective action: this is what I
ought to do, and that is what you ought to do, under the circumstances,
in view of realizing the point of our joint act. The point of joint action is
also always a normative point, even though the kind of ought involved
in playing music together or walking together or, say, engaging in a
contract of sale are different in each case. Significantly, what it is that
we ought to do together-the normative point of joint action-may itself
be open to discussion and transformation over time. In short, while
there are of course a host of nonlegal collectives, there are no
non-normative kinds thereof.
Before turning to the problem of closure, let me highlight one way in
which this nutshell account of law in the first-person plural perspective
is both close to and quite different from a systems-theoretical approach
to law. Indeed, whereas systems theory would refer to a "process of
communication," a first-person plural account of legal order sees an
interlocking web of individual acts-participant agency-the unity of
which is intelligible in terms of the normative point of joint action. 44 I
hasten to add that the two accounts of legal order are not mutually
exclusive; the point is, instead, that the third-person sociological
account of systems theory presupposes the first-person plural account of
legal order, but not vice versa.
There are other similarities and differences between these two
approaches, some of which I will explore in the coming pages. But the
foregoing suffices to justify by way of a very compact, three-step
argument why and in what way legal orders require a closure. First,
and summarizing my earlier considerations, legal orders presuppose the
first-person plural perspective of a "we" in joint action. 45 It is this
first-person plural perspective to which John Perry Barrow appeals in
his Declaration of Independence and, more generally, which is involved
in collective self-constitutionalization. Second, there can be no joint
agency by a manifold of individuals, whether two or indeterminately
many, absent a normative point of their act: that which their joint
action is about. Here again, this is what Barrow's Declaration of
44. NIKLAs LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS 143-45 (John Bednarz, Jr. & Dirk Baeder,
trans., 1995); GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS, supra note 40, 422-25.
45. Although I cannot discuss this point here, the first-person, plural perspective is not
the same as Hart's "internal" perspective.
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Independence illustrates when he asserts that "we are creating a world
where anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no matter how
singular, without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity."46 Acts
draw their meaning as legal acts from their inclusion in an interlocking
web of acts oriented to realizing a normative point. Third, there can be
no normative point in law absent a closure. This closure is material, to
the extent that it not only indicates what joint action is about, but also
what action is called for to realize a normative point. It is also personal,
determining whose action is called for; spatial, establishing where action
is called for; and temporal, indicating when it is called for. All legal
orders are closed in space, in time, in membership, and in the content of
the acts they allow and disallow. While I have been concerned to discuss
the spatial and subjective closure required for the emergence of a global
Internet community, it would not be difficult to extend the analysis to
its temporal and material closure. If who ought to do what, where, and
when is intelligible by reference to the normative point of joint action,
then conversely these four dimensions of legal action give concrete
shape to its normative point, even though they need not exhaust the
spatial, temporal, subjective, and material conditions under which the
normative point of the apposite joint act can be realized.
What does closure achieve? An answer to this question leads
straight to collective identity and its contrasting terms. Following Paul
Ricoeur, I distinguish between two forms of identity: sameness (idem)
and selfhood (ipse). Although Ricceur elaborates on these from the
perspective of individual identity, collective identity also involves
sameness and selfhood.47 Sameness can be parsed into numerical and
qualitative identity. The former concerns unity or oneness, as in the
expression "one and the same"; its contrasting term is plurality, as
when one refers to two or more things.48 The latter refers to extreme
resemblance; its contrasting term is dissemblance or difference, as when
"a" is said to be different to "b." The second form of identity is selfhood.
It involves the capacity of agents to view themselves in the first person
perspective as the bearers of certain beliefs and the authors of certain
actions. 49 Selfhood speaks to the first-person plural perspective when
individuals refer to themselves as members of a group and to the
group's intentions and actions by using indexical words such as "we,"
46. A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, supra note 16.
47. PAUL RICOEUR, ONESELF As ANOTHER 2-3, 115-25 (Kathleen Blarney trans., 1992)
(1990).
48. Id. at 116.
49. PETTIT, supra note 40, at 115-19.
711
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2
"us," "our," and "ours." The contrasting term for selfhood is, according to
Ricceur, other than self-alterity or otherness.50
So, returning to our question, closure gives rise to collective identity
as sameness and to its contrasting terms. As concerns quantitative
sameness, closure brings about numerical identity by giving rise to one
legal order, which stands in contrast to multiple legal orders. As
concerns qualitative sameness, closure gives rise to a legal collective
that is different than other legal orders, and which can itself change,
becoming different over time. Notice that theories of legal pluralism
appeal to both forms of idem-identity. On the one hand, and trivially, at
issue is a plurality of legal orders, many rather than one: the contrast to
quantitative identity. On the other hand, and no less trivially, at issue
are different legal orders which "co-exist" in a single spatio-temporal
context: the contrast to qualitative identity. Importantly, however, the
notions of plurality and difference presupposed by theories of legal
pluralism also apply, for example, to a basket of assorted fruits,
including pears, apples, and bananas. Here also, there is a plurality of
"entities," and each of these "entities" is different to the others. To put it
another way, oneness and plurality, resemblance and dissemblance, are
contrasts which are applicable to all things in a very broad sense of the
term "thing," which includes bodies, events, acts, persons, and the like.
Yet, sameness and its contrasts by no means exhaust what closure
brings about. Indeed, closure speaks primarily to the emergence of
selfhood and otherness. Inclusion and exclusion are actor-categories,
categories that make sense from a first-person perspective. So, on the
one hand, closure as inclusion gives rise to a collective as an actor: as a
"plural subject," to borrow Margaret Gilbert's phrase.51 Closure makes it
possible for a manifold of individuals to view themselves as a group, the
members of which ought to act jointly. In a word, closure not only gives
rise to collective identity as sameness, but also to collective identity as
ipseity: to a self.52 On this reading, closure brings about inclusion as a
50. RICOEUR, supra note 47; accord PETTIT, supra note 40, at 117-18.
51. GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS, supra note 40, at 199-200.
52. See here an important difference with systems theory, for which the "autos" of
autopoiesis is not equivalent to the self of collective selfhood. More generally, and this is
no more than a tentative claim requiring further exploration and development in a later
publication, I wonder whether a systems-theoretical approach to law doesn't rely
exclusively on identity as sameness, when explaining the identity over time of a legal
order, purging collective identity as selfhood from its account. This would not be
surprising, granted Luhmann's relentless move to eradicate subjectivity from the concept
of a social system. While I would want to join Luhmann in dropping the notion of
transcendental subjectivity from a viable account of social orders, including legal orders,
this move need not entail jettisoning the concept of subjectivity in the sense of collective
agency.
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collective self-inclusion. On the other hand, closure gives rise to a
domain of our own. The emergence of collective selfhood goes hand in
hand with the emergence of an own space, the bounded unity of places
we call ours; an own time, the bounded series of events we call our
history; an own content, the bounded unity of interlocking acts we call
our joint acts; an own subjectivity, the bounded set of individuals we call
our members. As Barrow notes, "you do not know our culture, our
ethics, or the unwritten codes that already provide our society more
order than could be obtained by any of your imposition."53
If all of this goes into collective self-inclusion, what is excluded
therefrom? What is the contrasting term for collective self-inclusion? In
a preliminary formulation, collective self-inclusion goes hand in hand
with other-exclusion, that is, with the exclusion of "other than self." But
this remains a highly abstract formulation that casts little or no light on
what is "other than self' with respect to collectives. No less importantly,
otherness is a far broader category than strangeness, which emerged in
our account of the global Internet community. By these lights, it
remains unclear how the closure that gives rise to a collective also calls
forth otherness and strangeness, and, more pointedly,
otherness-as-strangeness.
Answers to these questions begin to materialize if we bear in mind
that what collective self-closure includes is law, whereas what it
excludes is nonlaw. From the perspective of the collective, law is on this
side of a self-closure; nonlaw on the other side. Importantly, the
first-person plural inclusion of law and exclusion of nonlaw is
asymmetrical in at least four decisive ways. First, the divide is drawn
from one of the two sides in the very process of giving rise to both,
rather than from a third position: we include ourselves as a legal order
and exclude the rest as nonlaw. By laying down the broad lines of joint
action and its normative point, which means determining who ought to
do what, where, and when, the closure that gives rise to a collective is
only concerned with establishing what will count for it as law; it says
nothing, and can say nothing, about what lies beyond the pale of joint
action and its normative point: nonlaw. The divide is also asymmetrical
in a second way. What self-closure does is to indicate, at least
minimally, what is legally important and relevant to the collective, i.e.
what is the normative point that joint action seeks to realize. By
contrast, nonlaw is all the rest. It is the collective's other, in a very broad
sense: "other than self," to borrow Ricoeur's vocabulary. Nonlaw is a
residual (rather than negative) category because it encompasses
everything that is irrelevant and unimportant with a view to realizing
53. A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, supra note 16.
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the normative point of joint action. All a legal collective can do with
respect to nonlaw is to declare tracts of it to be relevant and important,
thereby drawing these into the ambit of law, or to declare unimportant
and irrelevant what had been part of a legal order, thereby
relinquishing it to the domain of nonlaw. Whence a third asymmetry:
law is preferred to nonlaw.
These considerations on law and nonlaw, relevance and irrelevance,
importance and unimportance, resonate with Husserl's descriptions of a
Heimwelt (a home-world), which he sometimes contrasts to an
Aufljenwelt (an outer world).54 In an important passage of his
posthumously published notes on the phenomenology of
intersubjectivity, he formulates this contrast in the form of a question:
Doesn't the world as a environing life-world, hence as a
practical environing world, have an unpractical horizon,
a [domain of the] non-experienced and
non-experienceable, which is not merely 'out of bounds'
(ausser Spiel) practically (which would already be
practical), but rather a horizon that is not at all in
question for praxis?5 5
Notice that the passage turns on two distinctions that are
complementary but irreducible to each other. On the one hand, a
home-world distinguishes between action that is in and out of bounds,
while comprising both. On the other hand, the home-world has an
external horizon that separates it from what Husserl calls an
"irrelevant outside": "[T]he practical interest is within (Drinnen)."5 6 As
concerns law, this irrelevant outside, which lies beyond the pale of
practical interest because it has been excluded from what is germane to
joint action by a collective, is the domain of nonlaw. Whence a fourth
asymmetry between law and nonlaw: inside is preferred to outside.
If we reformulate the notion of closure as giving rise to the
first-person preferential distinction between order and nonorder, we
advance a step further toward clarifying our understanding of closure
and the difference between inclusion and exclusion at issue in
constitutionalism, societal or otherwise. The distinction is a first-person
distinction in that legal orders have the form of collectives whereby a
manifold of individuals act together over time. The distinction is
preferential in that nonorder functions as the residual domain of what
54. HUSSERL, supra note 38, at 212, 419, 656 (translation by author).
55. Id. at 431. (translation by author).
56. Id. (translation by author).
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is unimportant. I speak of nonorder, finally, rather than of disorder,
because the latter is the privative form of legal order. In contrast with
disorder, nonlaw comprises the ambit of the unordered.5 7
A number of aspects of this preliminary characterization of nonlaw
require further analysis. The first is that the distinction between law
and nonlaw, as described heretofore, is not the massive distinction
between law "in general" and nonlaw "in general." Instead, it refers to
the distinction between a concrete legal order and what is unordered
with respect to that legal order. Indeed, the unordered is a relational
concept through and through: if the unordered is what falls beyond the
scope of joint action by a collective, then different collectives will have
different domains of the unordered. Notice that this includes
"overlapping" legal orders, in which the domain left unordered by a
collective can be occupied by another collective.
Secondly, and closely related to the first aspect, the unordered is,
from the first-person plural perspective of a collective, a legal void.
Husserl speaks, in this context, of home-worlds as having an "empty
outside" (leeren Draussen).5 8 Whereas a legal order has "the structural
form of a filled spatio-temporality," its unordered outside constitutes an
"'empty' spatio-temporality."5 9 Yet, although empty from the perspective
of joint action by a collective, the domain of the unordered makes room
for other legal orders, other collectives that organize themselves as legal
orders. Returning to our earlier observation, if nonlaw is the "other" of a
collective self, then the other of a collective includes its others, that is,
other collectives.
A third aspect concerns a legal order as a realm of possibilities.
Legal possibilities are a species of practical possibilities, that is, the
range of acts available to us, the members of a collective, when acting
together in the course of a legal practice: legal com-possibilities. In this
vein, law opens up practical possibilities by empowering certain actions
and indeterminately many-but not infinitely many-ways of
connecting these actions to each other (paying for a tram ride, going into
a grocery store, taking your food purchases home in a cab). Moreover,
legal possibilities, in the sense of normative empowerments, call forth
the possibility of illegality, that is, comportment in breach of what is
legally empowered.6 o By contrast, and in line with what has been noted
57. See BERNHARD WALDENFELS, ORDER IN THE TWILIGHT 3 (David J. Parent trans.,
1996).
58. See HUSSERL, supra note 38, at 431 (translation by author).
59. Id. at 139, 236 (translation by author).
60. It is in this sense, I believe that one should read Hans Kelsen's notion of
Ermachtigung, which became ever more important in his reformulations of the legal
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above, the unordered is not simply the absence of legal possibilities;
instead, the unordered comprises a surfeit, rather than a dearth, of
practical possibilities that have been leveled down to the status of the
irrelevant and unimportant, as the price that must be paid if there is to
be any legal empowerment at all.
A fourth and decisive feature concerns the divide between legal
(dis)order and the unordered. In effect, this divide is not posited
separately from the boundaries that determine who ought to do what,
where, and when. To the contrary, the divide between a legal order and
its unordered runs along each of the boundaries whereby a collective
establishes who ought to do what, where, and when. Indeed, each
boundary drawn by a collective delimits what it deems to be important
and relevant, partitioning it from what is unimportant and irrelevant.
But because the unordered is a residual category, and as such opaque to
joint action by a collective, the divide between a legal order and what it
leaves unordered functions differently than boundaries within a legal
order. On the one hand, boundaries join and separate such that
selecting products one wants to purchase in a grocery store demands
understanding how the store's pay-point marks a spatial boundary in
both separating the food store from other places within a unity of places
and joining it thereto. On the other hand, while the divide between a
legal order and its unordered domain runs along this pay-point, as it
does along all other spatial boundaries of the apposite legal order, it
does not join and separate places in the way boundaries do. Whereas
places within a legal order are reversible in that, under the conditions
dictated by joint action, a legal agent can move from one to the other
and back, there is no such reversibility between legal order and the
unordered.6 1
Consequently, qua self, a collective is "in" space and time in a way
that is irreducible to how things-including collectives, when viewed as
things-are "in" space and time. Theories of legal pluralism are blind to
this fundamental difference. Indeed, "in-ness" speaks, in the former
case, to the divide between a legal order and its unordered, such that
realizing the normative point of joint action by a collective requires a
spatio-temporal discontinuity between collective self and other than self.
Let me highlight this point by distinguishing between boundaries and
frontiers. Whereas there can be no legal boundaries absent a spatial
continuity within which different ought-places are differentiated and
"ought." See HANs KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 15-16 (Max Knight trans., U. Cal.
Press 1967) (1960).
61. See generally Hans Lindahl, Boundaries and the Concept of Legal Order, 2
JURISPRUDENCE 73 (2011), for a discussion of phenomenology of pay-points as boundaries
and as frontiers of a legal order.
716
WE AND CYBERLAW
interconnected, frontiers mark the confines of a legal order, hence a
discontinuity and an asymmetry between inside and outside. To leave,
crossing over into the far side of the frontier, is to abandon what a
collective deems to be the space of law; to arrive, crossing over from
beyond the far side of the frontier, is to come from an ought-place that
has no place in the single distribution of legal places made available by
a legal order. In this sense, global legal orders are perforce "bounded" in
space. The frontiers of legal orders are a species of thresholds about
which Bernhard Waldenfels observes that "there is always a privileged
domain from which the threshold itself is crossed, and a shadowy
domain from which the forbidden, alarming, and endangering streams
forth."62 A threshold-crossing came about when the Somali man entered
Westergaard's home from a place that was elsewhere than in the unity
of ought-places that compose the home-world (Heimwelt) in which
Westergaard and Barrow dwell; he entered from a strange world-a
Fremdwelt.
The threshold-crossing by the Somali man allows us to introduce,
however briefly, the notion of strangeness-otherness-as-strangeness-
into our account of legal order. Let me lodge two caveats right away.
The first is that strangeness is not primarily a "cultural" category; it
points to a specific experience of reality from the first-person
perspective, whether individual or collective. Secondly, although the
notion of strangeness does not figure as such in legal orders in which
reality is disclosed on the basis of the distinction between legality and
illegality, the experience of strangeness is by no means alien to legal
orders. I dub this experience alegality. I hasten to note that alegality is
not equivalent to nonlaw, although there could be no alegality in the
absence of the unordered. Indeed, alegal comportment is comportment
that, having been relegated to the sphere of what a collective views as
irrelevant and unimportant, emerges therefrom to question what a
concrete collective calls legal (dis)order. More precisely, by questioning
how a collective draws the distinction between legality and illegality,
alegal comportment questions how it sets the divide between legal
(dis)order and the unordered.63
This mode of appearance of comportment is what I have sought to
grasp with the compound term "alegality." For the one, "legality" in
alegality comprises both terms of (il)legality as drawn by a concrete
collective: something appears as relevant and important from the
perspective of the collective, hence as legal or illegal. For the other,
alegality does not merely mean the negation of law, for that would be
62. WALDENFELS, supra note 57, at 12.
63. A far fuller account of otherness-as-strangeness is offered in LINDAHL, FAULT LINES
OF GLOBALISATION, supra note 39.
717
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2
legal disorder: the privative manifestation of legal order. Instead, it
speaks to other ways of ordering comportment as being important and
relevant, despite having been leveled down to what is unimportant and
irrelevant for the collective. So, if the "legality" of alegality speaks to a
relation between comportment and the collective it challenges, to the
extent that comportment registers as relevant because it is (il)legal, the
"a" of alegality speaks to a nonrelation between the comportment and
the legal order, that is, comportment that raises a normative claim that
does not register as normatively relevant from the first-person
perspective of the collective. Comportment is alegal because it conjoins
both dimensions. This is what took place when the Somali man broke
down the front door of Westergaard's home to kill him. His act could be
brought into a normative relation with the legal order-was accessible
to it-because it could be qualified as legal or illegal; it was an
important and relevant act that demanded legal qualification. But the
normative challenge the Somali man raised could not be brought into
relation with the legal order; his act evoked the importance and
relevance of a form of normative empowerment that was practically
in-com-possible with the legal order he questioned by seeking to kill
Westergaard. In this sense, his act was inaccessible to the legal order:
alegal. This, precisely, is what Husserl calls strangeness: "accessibility
in its genuine inaccessibility, in the mode of incomprehensibility."64
That there can be no inclusion without exclusion entails, most
fundamentally, that there can be no (il)legality without alegality.
IV. FUNCTIONAL COSMOPOLITANISM AND THE LOGIC OF TOTALIZATION
We seem to have strayed very far from societal constitutionalism
and its concerns when venturing down the path of a theory of law that
appeals to analytical accounts of collective action and to a
phenomenology of strangeness. In fact, the opposite is true. I have been
doing nothing other than outlining what it means that global "sectors"
of society must engage in a process of self-constitutionalization. My
hunch is that, because it is collectives rather than function systems that
constitutionalize themselves, we can no longer take for granted that the
"self' of self-constitutionalization is the autos of autopoiesis, nor that
this systems-theoretical interpretation of self-(re)production governs
how societal constitutions include and exclude. This is certainly not the
place to engage in a full-blown analysis of the similarities and
differences between a theory of law in the first person and a
systems-theoretical approach to law. Instead, my sole concern is to
64. HUSSERL, supra note 38, at 631 (translation by author).
718
WE AND CYBERLAW
establish how a theory of law in the first-person contributes to shedding
new light on societal constitutionalism. I concentrate hereinafter on two
questions. First, how might this theory demand that we reconsider the
role of the inclusion-exclusion distinction in a theory of societal
constitutionalism? Second, what interpretation does it offer of inclusion
and exclusion as a constitutional question? I address the first of these
issues in the present section; the second is addressed in the final section
of this paper.
A reader steeped in systems theory will have been struck by a
number of similarities between the account of the inclusion-exclusion
difference defended by a systems-theoretical approach to societal
constitutionalism and that espoused by theory of law in the first person.
Here are five salient similarities: (i) There can be no inclusion without
exclusion; the difference as such is constitutive for systems/orders. A
system or order that would include without excluding ceases to be such.
(ii) Operations/acts by systems/orders are operations/acts of drawing the
boundary that includes and excludes. This holds both for operations
that (re)produce the boundary between a system and its environment
and for comportment that (re)sets the divide between a legal order and
its domain of the unordered. In other words, identification and
differentiation are the two faces of the single operation/act of setting
boundaries: to identify is to differentiate and to differentiate is to
identify. (iii) The system/order includes what is relevant thereto and
excludes what is irrelevant. There is a strong discontinuity between
what is included and what is excluded; the former is relevant, the latter
irrelevant. This strong discontinuity holds as much for the difference
between a system and its environment as for the difference between
legal (dis)order and its domain of the unordered. (iv) Regardless of
whether one refers to systemic "self-observation" or to the authoritative
determination of boundaries from a first-person plural perspective, the
closure of a system/order demands second-level operations/acts that
monitor and uphold unity as set in first-level operations/acts of
inclusion and exclusion. (v) Closure into a system/order is always a
closure of possibilities. Indeed, inclusion opens up a finite range of
possible operations/actions and combinations thereof, while excluding
others. The domain of what is excluded does not speak to the absence of
possibilities, but rather to an excess or surfeit of possible acts/operations
and combinations of acts/operations, albeit possibilities which are
irrelevant for the system/order. Accordingly, both accounts of
inclusion/exclusion defend the necessity of the boundary that includes
and excludes while also postulating the contingency of how it is drawn.
In each of these ways, a theory of law in the first-person provides
strong support for Teubner's claim that the inclusion-exclusion
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difference is the central issue that must be addressed by a theory of law
and a fortiori by a theory of societal constitutionalism. But fundamental
differences are also concealed in these similarities, differences which, in
my opinion, question some of the key presuppositions governing a
theory of societal constitutionalism.
The first point of discussion concerns the primordial "locus," as one
could put it, of inclusion and exclusion. On Luhmann and Teubner's
view, that locus is the function system. First and foremost, function
systems include and exclude, even though they must rely on
organizations to institutionalize functional inclusion/exclusion. The
primordiality of functional inclusion and exclusion becomes fully visible
in modernity, in which the emergence of functional differentiation
radically transforms the situation of individuals. Indeed,
individuals can no longer be defined by social positions
into which they are born. They no longer belong to a
partial system of society; they must gain access to all
function systems to be able to live in accordance with
their demands (anspruchsgemifJ). Societal inclusion
must accordingly be regulated in a new way . . . . Since
around 1800 the situation is clear, and it involves both
care by the function systems as well as participation in
them, in both passive and active relations. Everyone has
legal capacity; everyone may lay claim to treatment in
case of sickness. Everyone must go to school; everyone is
affected by political decisions, hence entitled to
participate in them. Everyone is capable of receiving and
spending money and participates, accordingly, in the
economy. In all these respects, equality of opportunities
and freedom of choice are insufficiently realized.6 5
So, the "realization of these claims (Anspriiche)"66 is the aim of
constitutionalizing the inclusion of everyone in each of the function
systems, such that these claims can become entitlements-enforceable
rights of access to function systems.
To assess this analysis, let us begin with Luhmann's account of the
claims raised by individuals in relation to function systems. On his
view, the function system itself is the addressee of such claims.6 7 No
doubt functions play a role in terms of the content of claims. But surely
65. LUHMANN, supra note 4, at 131-32 (translation by author).
66. Id. (translation by author).
67. Id. at 133.
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it is a collective, and not a function system, which must be the addressee
of claims. In other words, a claim is addressed to a manifold of
individuals considered as a unit in joint action. The claim will be
relevant to the extent that it impinges on the normative point to be
realized by joint action, and irrelevant, hence not even worthy of being
taken into consideration, if it does not. By the same token, a claim is
only such if it can be accepted or rejected; but acceptance or rejection
amounts to a collective decision about who ought to do what, where, and
when, that is, about what ought to count as joint action by the collective.
So, the very notion of a claim presupposes a collective to which it is
addressed, such that "laying claim to the function"6 8 amounts to laying
claim to certain kinds of comportment as demanded by the terms of joint
action. On this reading, a collective is not simply the vehicle or
instrument by which function systems address or do not address claims
raised by individuals against them; there is nothing "above" or "behind"
the collective to which claims are addressed, because to lay claim to a
function is simply to demand that a certain comportment take place in
accordance with the terms of joint action.6 9
This is not mere semantic correction; it has a capital implication for
the entire idea of inclusion and exclusion. Indeed, if all claim-talk is
collective-talk, so also is inclusionlexclusion-talk. Inclusion is, first and
foremost, inclusion into a collective, and exclusion, exclusion from a
collective. Now, inclusion into a collective implies inclusion into the
spatial, temporal, subjective, and material dimensions of joint action.
This, concretely, is what is involved in access to a "function." To claim a
"right to access" to a global "sector" is to claim that one is entitled to
participate in joint action by the apposite collective, which means that
one claims that one fulfills the criteria for participant agency as
concerns its subjective, temporal, spatial, and material conditions. In
particular, all access to a "function" is spatial access, hence access to an
inside, and subjective access, access to membership.
This is obviously at loggerheads with the view defended by
Luhmann and Teubner, for whom the globalization of function systems
shows that both of these forms of access are contingent and
anachronistic. 70 It no longer makes sense to speak of inclusion/exclusion
in terms of membership when, in a globalized society, everyone, hence
68. Id. (translation by author of "die Funktion in Anspruch nehmen').
69. See Teubner, supra note 14, at 222 ("The various attempts at global
constitutionalism are directed rather at social processes 'beneath' the function systems.")
(emphasis added).
70. Niklas Luhmann, Territorial Borders as System Boundaries, in COOPERATION AND
CONFLICT IN BORDER AREAS, 237 (Raimondo Strassoldo & Giovanni Delli Zotti eds., 1982);
Teubner supra note 3, at 7-8.
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the "entire population," lays claim to the different function systems. By
the same token, it no longer makes sense to speak of inclusion/exclusion
in spatial terms when law has become global law, that is, a
"self-reproducing, worldwide legal discourse which closes its meaning
boundaries by the use of the legal/illegal binary code and reproduces
itself by processing a symbol of global (not national) validity."7 1
The whole thrust of a theory of law in the first-person developed
heretofore is, however, to reject the assumption that inclusion/exclusion
can be understood independently of the fourfold closure governing
collective self-constitutionalization.
As concerns space, a collective that would constitutionalize itself
must close itself as an inside with respect to an outside, laying claim to
a space as its own and vice versa. The reference to an "own" space shows
that the inside-outside distinction is ambiguous, as it can mean a
domestic space in contrast to foreign spaces and a familiar space in
contrast to a strange space. A strange space is intimated by
ought-places that have no place in a distribution of places deemed to be
a collective's own space, yet which, as ought-places, raise a normative
claim of their own. The two modes of the inside-outside distinction are
irreducible to each other: a strange place need not be foreign; a foreign
place need not be strange. Crucially, while the distinction between
domestic and foreign spaces is contingent, the distinction between own
and strange places is constitutive of legal order. In this fundamental
sense, global legal orders are no less bounded in space than state law,
international law, or any other form of law. This is precisely the
significance of the Somali man breaking down the front door of
Westergaard's home in an attempt to kill him. To return to Teubner's
characterization of global law cited above, there is no meaning to closure
absent a spatial closure. In short, societal constitutions must rely on
inclusion and exclusion as spatial categories if they want to be societal
constitutions.
Comparable considerations apply with respect to membership. On
Luhmann and Teubner's account, the liberation of function systems
from the tutelage of states and their territorial boundaries implies that
everyone, independent of membership in a political collective, can, in
principle, lay claim to what function systems have to offer: "everyone
may lay claim to treatment in case of sickness. Everyone must go to
school." 72 And, returning to the example of a global digital community,
its constitutionalization must guarantee a "universal . . . right of access
to digital communication." 73 Yet, regardless of their "scale," collectives
71. Teubner, supra note 3, at 12 (emphasis removed).
72. LUHMANN, supra note 4, at 132.
73. Teubner, supra note 2, at 3-4.
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necessarily call forth bounded membership in the form of participant
agency. Because participant agency is defined in terms of the realization
of the normative point of joint action, also participant agency that
involves what is prima facie "the entire population" of the earth
necessarily involves bounded membership, even if the boundary may
remain initially concealed. But this boundary becomes visible in the face
of comportment that radically contests the normative point of joint
action by a collective that putatively gathers together everyone. Is not
such a contestation of a global legal order at the heart of the Somali
man's attempt to kill Westergaard? What is most interesting about this
case is not that he rejects being included in a global digital community;
this could easily be accommodated by a theory of societal
constitutionalism in terms of the individual's freedom of choice to give
form to his personal identity by deciding whether or not to make use of
a constitutionally guaranteed right of access to digital communication.
Instead, the whole point of the Somali's act was to contest, on normative
grounds, that anyone may be allowed to engage in digital
communication involving images of the Prophet Muhammad or of any
prophet, for that matter. This claim (Anspruch) is irreconcilable with
the claim raised by Westergaard, Barrow, and their liberal brethren of
constitutionalizing freedom of digital communication. So, who belongs to
the "we" who gathers somewhere to enact a cyber-constitution? Many
people scattered across the face of the earth belong to the "we," but not
the entire population. To put it provocatively, the "we" that would enact
a cyber-constitution (or any other constitution of a global sector) cannot
be the entire population if it is to be a whole in action.
This insight has an important implication as concerns Teubner's
conceptualization of globalization. "Globalisation," as he puts it, "does
not mean simply global capitalism, but the worldwide realisation of
functional differentiation." 74 So conceived, globalization has two
corollaries, to which I referred earlier in this paper. First, to the extent
that function systems become global, they are no longer hemmed in by
spatial boundaries, which, in turn, are indispensable to secure
subjective boundaries such as membership in a collective. Once function
systems liberate themselves from the spatial tutelage of the territorial
state, the conditions are created for universality, that is, for access by
the entire population to each function system. Second, the globalization
of functional differentiation means that the universality of inclusion is
partial, inasmuch as inclusion is in each case inclusion within a given
function system. These two features allow Luhmann and Teubner to
argue that systems theory can endorse globalization while also, in their
74. Teubner, supra note 2, at 14.
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view, opposing a logic of totalization. 75 Accordingly, partial
universalization allows them to defend the "unfinished project of
modernity" without having to pay the price of postulating a global polity
as the condition for its completion.76 Whereas JUrgen Habermas and
other proponents of a global polity effectively advocate a form of political
cosmopolitanism, Luhmann and Teubner champion the completion of
the project of modernity in the guise of a functional cosmopolitanism.
A theory of law in the first person casts doubt on this strategy.
Certainly, bounded state territoriality is contingent, as is state
citizenship. But there can be no process of collective
self-constitutionalization, global or otherwise, absent a closure that is
spatial as much as it is subjective. Regardless of their "scale," collectives
call forth a spatial boundary separating inside from outside in the form
of the frontier between the differentiated interconnection of
ought-places required to realize the normative point of joint action by
the collective and ought-places that are practically in-com-possible with
that spatial unity. By the same token, and regardless of their "scale,"
collectives call forth bounded membership in the form of participant
agency. Essentially, globalization changes nothing with respect to
inclusion and exclusion. To the contrary, it is only a distraction.
Hence, I am worried that Teubner's interpretation of globalization
as partial universality entrenches, in its own way, the logic of
totalization his theory of societal constitutionalism seeks to leave
behind. Even though he emphatically defends the partiality of function
systems as a way of parrying the charge of totalization, he effectively
continues this logic by assuming that societal constitutions can create
the conditions for all-inclusiveness, albeit restricted in each case to the
respective globalized function system. What holds for Habermas also
holds for Teubner: the aspiration to universality is the aspiration to
totalization. A theory of societal constitutionalism seems to be
animated, no less than the cosmopolitan theories it opposes, by a
teleological conception of rationality aimed at realizing
all-inclusiveness, even if limited to functional all-inclusiveness. More
pointedly, one may wonder whether a theory of societal
constitutionalism does not claim to draw its normative force from its
attempt to hold on to universality and all-inclusiveness, even
though-and perhaps because-it proclaims the partiality and
irreducible plurality of function systems.77
75. LUHMANN, supra note 7, at 625.
76. HABERMAS AND THE UNFINISHED PROJECT OF MODERNITY (MAURIZIO PASSERIN
D'ENTRkVES & SEYLA BENHABIB eds., 1997).
77. It is significant, in this respect, that a systems-theoretically inspired sociological
study of the "stranger" argues that, "at the end this society is a global society, and that
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If one is to move beyond a logic of totalization, it is not enough to
argue that there can be no inclusion without exclusion; one must take
the further step of acknowledging that there can be no inside without an
outside-literally. This means acknowledging that there is a domain of
the strange that is irreducible to and refuses assimilation into what a
collective, whatever its "scale" and normative point, would call its own
space and its own membership.7 8
V. CONSTITUTIVE AND LIMITATIVE RULES
The foregoing considerations concentrated on the concept of
inclusion and exclusion that follows from the self-constitutionalization
of collectives. I would now like to approach inclusion/exclusion as a
properly constitutional question: In what way does the account of
inclusion/exclusion that has emerged in the foregoing pages shed light
on the concept of a constitution, whether of a global collective or
otherwise?
Remember, in this respect, the core insight of Teubner's theory of
societal constitutionalism: constitutions are composed of constitutive
and limitative rules, that is, rules which grant access to a
communicative medium and rules which limit the expansiveness and
self-destructive potential inherent to all function systems. If the former
rules secure the individual's inclusion in function systems, the latter
rules protect the individual's autonomy against encroachment by
function systems. The assumption underpinning this insight is that
constitutions concern the regulation of function systems, not of states.
As long as the state captured the regulation of function systems, the
(societal) scope and (constitutive and limitative) purport of constitutions
could remain concealed; the globalization of function systems, by
means that it no longer has a social outside, that there is no longer anyone that one could
legitimately call a stranger to society." See RUDOLF STICHWEH, DER FREMDE: STUDIEN ZU
SOZIOLOGIE UND SOZIALGESCHICHTE [THE FOREIGNER: STUDIES ON SOCIOLOGY AND
SOCIAL HISTORY] 174 (2010) (Ger.) (translation by author).
78. It will be objected that a legal order enacted by all humankind and for all
humankind is conceivable, hence a legal order without an outside. The problem, however,
lies in the representational structure hidden in the notion of "a legal order enacted by all
humankind." To begin with, "all" functions here as a "we (all) together" not as "we, each
(and all)." But this "we (all) together" presupposes a representation claim whereby
someone, who has not and cannot have been authorized to this effect, acts on behalf of
humanity as a whole in the very process of determining what counts as "human" for the
purpose of enacting the legal order. In other words, the (putative) representational act
that gets the legal order going also has to determine, at least minimally, what defines "our
common humanity" as the normative point of joint action. Inclusion and exclusion have
already begun, and so also, Habermas notwithstanding, a Weltaufenpolitik-a world of
external politics.
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contrast, discloses their true scope and purport and paves the way for
societal constitutions.
As noted at the outset of this paper, I find compelling Teubner's
thesis that constitutional theory urgently needs to relinquish its fixation
on state constitutionalism if it is to avoid a reductive reading of
constitutions and their significance for global law.7 9 No less compelling,
or so I think, is his thesis that the inclusion-exclusion difference is the
"constitutional question" par excellence.8 0 Far less compelling, to my
mind, is the further thesis that the task for constitutional theory would
be to make sense of self-constitution and self-limitation along functional
lines.8 1 For if it is collectives, not function systems, which
constitutionalize themselves, then the way to go is to inquire what it is
in collectives that calls forth constitutionalization, then to ask whether
and how the emergence of global collectives might pose new challenges
for constitutions and a theory of constitutionalism in a global setting.
So, my question comes down to this: In what way does everything that
has been said about inclusion/exclusion in the first-person plural
perspective both explain and demand the constitutionalization of
collectives, global or otherwise? In particular, how might they shed light
on Teubner's proposal to view constitutions as composed of constitutive
and limitative rules?
A first step toward an answer is, I submit, that there can be no
collective self-regulation absent a constitution. More precisely, the
argument for the constitutionalization of collectives is an argument
about collective self-identity as identity over time. In the same way that
something-a stone, a house, a tree-can be re-identified insofar as it
remains (more or less) the same over time, so also selfhood, as a form of
identity, entails permanence in time, even though irreducible to the
form of a substratum or substance. 82 RicOeur and Philip Pettit
characterize the temporal continuity of self-identity in similar ways. For
Ricceur, the paradigm of self-identity is keeping one's word, such that,
regardless of the vicissitudes an agent encounters after promising
something, the agent nonetheless makes good on her promise by doing
that to which she had committed herself.83 For Pettit, "[t]he agent will
be the same self as the person they were at an earlier time just so
far-and this will be a matter of degree-as they actively own or
endorse the claims and attitudes and actions of that earlier agent."84
79. TEUBNER, supra note 1, at 51-58.
80. Teubner, supra note 2, at 4.
81. TEUBNER, supra note 1, at 75-87.
82. RicOEUR, supra note 47, at 118.
83. Id.
84. PETTIT, supra note 40, at 85.
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Analogous considerations hold for collectives, which display self-identity
in the form of inter-temporal commitment. "[T]he words defended in the
past . . . will stand out for those of us in the collectivity as words that
'we' as a plural subject maintain."8 5 Collective self-identity is that mode
of identity in which a group agent sticks to its commitments over time
and which is fit to be held to its commitments.
A collective, when sustaining itself over times as a self, commits to
the realization of the normative point of joint action by its members.
Now, that to which a collective commits, when sustaining itself over
time as a self, is that its members shall realize the normative point of
joint action. In other words, a collective perdures as a self over time to
the extent that participant agents fulfill what are deemed to be mutual
expectations concerning who ought to do what, where, and when in light
of the normative point of joint action. But questions are bound to arise
along the way about what ought to count as the normative point of joint
action and, more radically, about whether there is any normative point
of joint action, such that a manifold of individuals ought to view
themselves as a collective.
These are precisely the kinds of issues that imperil collective
selfhood as identity over time. To deal with such situations, a collective
puts into place second-level authorities, whereby certain individuals,
acting on behalf of the group, (i) monitor joint action as concerns its
normative point and consistency over time, and (ii) take steps to uphold
joint action when its normative point is breached or when the
consistency of joint action over time is otherwise undermined or
threatened. I speak of "second-level" authority because joint action
authorizes or empowers certain individuals to engage in certain
comportment at certain times and in certain places with a view to
realizing the normative point of joint action. This first-level authority to
engage in participant agency is backed up by second-level authorities,
who also engage in participant agency within joint action, but in the
twofold sense of (i) and (ii) noted above. Obviously, it is possible to put
into place third-level or even higher-level authorities to monitor and
uphold participant agency by the lower level authorities. This tiered
structure of authority is what allows for collective self-regulation over
time; it affords a more or less robust self-identity to a collective, which
perdures over time as a collective self, that is, as a unity in action.
If we look at collectives along these lines, then it becomes clear what
a constitution is and why it is demanded by certain forms of joint
action.86 On my reading, a constitution is the set of rules which
85. Id. at 117.
86. I say "certain" forms of joint action because not all collectives involve second-level
authorities: if you and I take a walk together, to borrow the canonical example of theorists
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empower or authorize joint action, in particular second-level authority
or participant agency. In a word, a constitution is the set of rules that
make possible collective self-regulation over time. Let me call this, in
line with Teubner's favored usage, the "constitutive" role of
constitutions. Notice that, on this reading, a constitution is by no means
limited to states; to the contrary, state constitutions, as they have
emerged in modernity, are but a specific, historically contingent
manifestation of the constitutive role of constitutions.
What does this constitutive role have to do with inclusion/exclusion?
Everything. For if the emergence of joint action presupposes a closure
which brings about collective self-inclusion and other-exclusion, then
the constitutive rules of constitutions are the rules oriented to
monitoring and upholding the divide that separates legal (dis)order and
its domain of the unordered. But this is nothing other than the divide
between what is included and what is excluded. First-level participant
agency re-identifies the collective self, to the extent that comportment
meets mutual expectations about who ought to do what, where, and
when; to this extent also, first-level participant agency differentiates the
collective from other than self, as that which is simply irrelevant to joint
action and its normative point. Second-level participant
agency-authority in the strong sense-establishes what ought to count
as joint action in the face of questions about its normative point, which
arise in the course of first-level participant agency. That is, second-level
participant agency re-identifies a collective self and differentiates it
from other than self by establishing what ought to be relevant to joint
action, whether in the form of legal or illegal comportment.
Accordingly, the constitutive rules oriented to monitoring and
upholding the divide between legal (dis)order and its domain of the
unordered are rules of collective decision-making concerning what ought
to be included and what ought to be excluded from joint action. The
corollary of this insight is that, in light of questions concerning what
ought to count as joint action with a view to realizing its normative
point, collectives can declare tracts of the unordered to be relevant and
important, thereby drawing them into the ambit of law, or to declare
unimportant and irrelevant what had been part of a legal order, thereby
relinquishing it to the domain of the unordered. Hence, constitutive
rules work both ways: they can bring about greater inclusiveness by
empowering or authorizing comportment that had hitherto been
disempowered or a greater exclusiveness by disempowering and
de-authorizing comportment that had been authorized and empowered
of collective action, and in the course of our promenade cannot agree where we should go,
we simply part ways. Legal collectives, by contrast, do involve such second-level
authorities.
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under law. Both shifts presuppose that there is a gap between the
normative point of joint action and joint action as posited in a legal
order. On this reading, the central task of fundamental rights, as part of
the constitutive rules of a constitution, is to expose law as a default
setting of joint action and its normative point. From this perspective,
fundamental rights aim to show that more is possible, in the way of
collective self-regulation, than what a legal order has realized.
To summarize my argument thus far, constitutions as "constitutive"
rules are a necessary and irreducible feature of any collective that
would seek to secure its permanence over time in the face of questions
about joint action and its normative point. States, to reiterate my earlier
point, are but one form of such collectives, in the same way that state
constitutions are but one way of organizing the constitutive rules of
such collectives.
Does a theory of law in the first-person plural perspective offer
support for Teubner's thesis that, in addition to constitutive rules,
constitutions also include "limiting" or "restraining" rules? Might a
theory of law in the first-person plural perspective also accommodate
this insight?
I think it does, albeit not in the sense that societal constitutions
limit the expansive and self-destructive potential of function systems.
Collective self-restraint, for a theory of law in the first person, amounts
to restraint with respect to alegality. As conceptualized heretofore,
alegal comportment is comportment that calls into question the way in
which a collective draws the distinction between legality and illegality;
in other words, it challenges what a collective deems to be legally
relevant, advancing the claim that what has been excluded from joint
action as irrelevant is normatively relevant, even though it cannot be
accommodated in its own terms in the legal order it calls into question.
This was the upshot of the attempt by the Somali man to kill
Westergaard: his action is both relevant and irrelevant, accessible and
inaccessible, to the authorities called upon to judge his comportment, to
the extent that killing Westergaard is a practical possibility called forth
by values that are practically in-com-possible with the values
underpinning the liberal freedom of expression protected by the Danish
constitution and a fortiori by the "societal constitution" of the global
digital community envisaged by Barrow and his brethren.
In such situations, collective self-restraint amounts to
acknowledging, albeit indirectly, that alegal comportment raises a
normative claim that remains unaddressed in its own terms because
comportment must be qualified as legal or illegal in terms of the
collective's own normative point. Collective self-limitation is, strictly
speaking, an acknowledgment of the limited mode of existence of a
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collective self: alegal comportment is comportment that confronts the
collective self it with its limited normative possibilities because there
are normative possibilities beyond that limit, yet possibilities that are
in-com-possible with its own normative possibilities. A collective ceases
to engage in self-restraint, by contrast, when it refuses to acknowledge
that there is a normative claim that is being raised against the
collective, such that the collective qualification of the comportment as
(il)legal exhausts the latter's normative significance.
"Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto," or "I am a man, I
consider nothing that is human alien to me," runs the famous line in
Terence's play, The Self-Tormentor.87 It is perhaps not exaggerated to
state that this line encapsulates the cosmopolitan aim of realizing an
all-inclusive collective grounded in the humanity of human rights. But
because strangeness is an irreducible phenomenon of social life,
whoever endorses this tenet inevitably ends up endorsing its inverted
form: what is strange or alien is inhuman. The consequence is
predictable: why should a collective-including the Danish collective or
the global digital community that would realize functional
cosmopolitanism-restrain itself when confronted with inhuman
comportment?
An alternative begins to delineate itself when one acknowledges,
against the claim that nothing human is strange and against the claim
that what is strange is inhuman, that, paradoxically, the strange is
human. Would it not be in this paradoxical way that we would need to
understand the "humanity" of human rights? The implication of this
insight would be that the "humanity" of human rights not only appeals
to what a collective already includes or can include as its own normative
possibilities, but also to those normative possibilities that are
definitively excluded from the scope of joint action because they are
in-com-possible with its own possibilities, that is, with its
self-regulation. It is in this sense, I think, that the Somali man could
invoke human rights when defending himself of the charge of attempted
murder. And it is perhaps in this sense that human rights are part and
parcel of constitutions, societal or otherwise, that is, as rules for
collective self-restraint.
87. TERENCE, THE SELF-TORMENTOR 140 (Henry Thomas Riley trans., 1896)
(translation altered), available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/22188/22188-h/files/teren
ce3_4.html.
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